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Abstract
We evaluate Tencent’s QQ Browser, a popular mobile
browser in China with hundreds of millions of users—
including 16 million overseas, with respect to the threat
model of a man-in-the-middle attacker with state ac-
tor capabilities. This is motivated by information in
the Snowden revelations suggesting that another Chinese
mobile browser, UC Browser, was being used to track
users by Western nation-state adversaries.
Among the many issues we found in QQ Browser that
are presented in this paper, the use of “textbook RSA”—
that is, RSA implemented as shown in textbooks, with
no padding—is particularly interesting because it affords
us the opportunity to contextualize existing research in
breaking textbook RSA. We also present a novel attack
on QQ Browser’s use of textbook RSA that is distin-
guished from previous research by its simplicity. We em-
phasize that although QQ Browser’s cryptography and
our attacks on it are very simple, the impact is serious.
Thus, research into how to break very poor cryptography
(such as textbook RSA) has both pedagogical value and
real-world impact.
1 Introduction
Research into “real-world” cryptography often focuses
on relatively hard targets, such as SSL/TLS [2] or
ASP.NET [10]. Certain market segments, however, hide
much softer targets behind the veil of security-through-
obscurity. Analyzing the cryptography of these self-
rolled, lower quality applications of cryptography has
value mainly in terms of impact and pedagogy. The im-
pact can be great because, for a variety of reasons ranging
from education to market forces, major software vendors
with hundreds of millions of users often implement very
poor cryptography, as we show in this paper. We present
QQ Browser, a browser developed by Chinese company
Tencent, as a case study and identify research opportu-
nities that are specific to the kinds of exploits that are
useful for this type of market segment.
The pedagogical value of attacking very poor cryp-
tography comes from simplicity. For example, one of
the contributions of this paper is an adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA2) on a real-world RSA imple-
mentation that can be easily understood by, e.g., intro-
ductory cybersecurity class students.
Through reverse engineering, we have documented
the encryption protocols used by QQ Browser to protect
the trove of sensitive information each client uploads to
QQ Browser’s servers (this is summarized in Section 2).
This sensitive information includes International Mobile
Equipment Identifier (IMEI) numbers, web pages vis-
ited, locational data, and many other kinds of private data
about a QQ Browser user. The possibility that Tencent
shares this information with state actors is explored in
existing reports [15], and QQ Browser’s data collection
mirrors competing browsers such as UC Browser [12]
and Baidu Browser [14]. In this paper we consider a dif-
ferent threat model, that of attacks by a state actor on QQ
Browser’s cryptography implementation so that the state
actor does not require Tencent’s complicity to violate
user privacy. This is motivated by reports [1, 21] that UC
Browser’s poor cryptography was being exploited by the
Five Eyes intelligence agencies1 to index that browser’s
users by IMEI. Note that QQ Browser has over 16 mil-
lion users that are outside of China.
One set of vulnerabilities that we present (in Sec-
tion 3) would easily enable indexing of QQ Browser’s
users by IMEI and decryption of private data transmit-
ted to QQ Browser’s servers. This set of attacks is based
on, e.g., QQ’s poor pseudorandom number generation,
use of hard-coded symmetric keys, and use of a 128-
bit RSA key in earlier versions. These attacks are par-
ticularly devastating, since they would allow any man-
in-the-middle attacker, with minimal resources, to easily
decrypt all sessions completely passively and offline.
The second set of vulnerabilities (presented in Sec-
1Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
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tion 4) is centered around QQ Browser’s use of textbook
RSA. This affords us the opportunity to contextualize
existing research on breaking textbook RSA and present
a novel attack on QQ Browser that is exceptionally sim-
ple. This CCA2 attack allows an attacker to decrypt any
session by making 128 of their own connections to QQ
Browser’s servers to crack the session key. This is a very
serious flaw, but would not scale to indexing all users by
IMEI and is not a passive, offline attack.
The third set of vulnerabilities (presented in Section 5)
is even more severe, because they would, in some cases,
allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to take complete con-
trol over a user’s device. We analyze QQ Browser’s up-
date mechanisms for both Android and Windows.
Our specific contributions are:
• We demonstrate an extremely simple attack on
QQ Browser’s pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) that would enable a state actor, or any other
man-in-the-middle attacker, to easily decrypt any
sessions that they were able to record from the net-
work. This would be the easiest way to decrypt
all sessions offline and index them by IMEI. We
also discuss how previous versions of QQ Browser
used hard-coded symmetric session keys and 128-
bit RSA keys.
• We present an exceptionally simple CCA2 attack on
QQ Browser’s implementation of RSA, which is an
example of “textbook RSA” being used to protect
the private data of hundreds of millions of users.
This attack has pedagogical value because of its
real-world impact and simplicity, and is novel.
• We re-evaluate Boneh et al.’s [7] meet-in-the-
middle style attack on textbook RSA for 128-bit key
sizes and modern understandings of state actor ca-
pabilities. We find that this attack, which would be
attractive because it is passive and offline, does not
scale to 128-bit symmetric session keys.
• We present man-in-the-middle attacks on the update
mechanisms of both the Android and Windows ver-
sions of QQ Browser. Taken in the context of simi-
lar attacks from previous work, we find that patterns
emerge where man-in-the-middle attackers can de-
velop powerful attack primitives.
Finally, we put these vulnerabilities and related ex-
ploits in the context of related work in Section 6, and
find that more research is needed in certain areas of in-
quiry to address the problem of poor security and privacy
practices in specific (but very large and important) mar-
ket segments. This is followed by a brief summary in the
conclusion.
2 QQ Browser Cryptography
When users run QQ Browser on Android, it makes a se-
ries of what QQ Browser interally terms as “WUP re-
quests” to QQ Browser’s server. These WUP requests
contain information such as a user’s International Mobile
Equipment Identifier (IMEI), International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identification (IMSI), QQ username, WiFi MAC
address, SSID of connected WiFi access point and of all
in-range access points, Android ID, URLs of all web-
pages visited, and other private information. More de-
tails about WUP requests are available in the report by
Knockel et al. [15] which analyzes version 6.3.0.1920 of
QQ Browser. Here we focus on the encryption protocol
of the version of QQ Browser that Tencent released as
a response to the vulnerabilities identified in that report.
The main vulnerability that they fixed that is relevant to
the attacks that we present is that they increased the size
of the RSA key from 128 bits to 1024 bits. Before this
fix using factorization to crack the private key took less
than a second on Wolfram Alpha.
Specifically, we analyzed version 6.5.0.2170 of QQ
Browser for Android. This version, and the updated QQ
Browser server, implement the following steps to encrypt
WUP requests from the client to the server:
1. First, the client generates a 128-bit AES session key
for the session, using a pseudorandom number gen-
erator (PRNG) seeded with the current time in mil-
liseconds since the Unix epoch.
2. Then, the client encrypts this session key using a
1024-bit RSA public key. The public key has expo-
nent 65537, and the RSA implementation is “text-
book RSA,” meaning that no form of padding—
such as OAEP [3]—is applied at all.
3. The client uses the AES session key to encrypt the
WUP request, in ECB mode.
4. The client sends the RSA-encrypted AES session
key and the encrypted WUP request to the server.
5. The server decrypts the RSA-encrypted AES key it
received from the client using its private key, then
chooses the least significant 128 bits of the plaintext
to be the AES session key.
6. The server decrypts the WUP request using the AES
session key that it obtained via RSA decryption.
7. If the AES ciphertext received from the client de-
crypts to a valid WUP request correctly, the server
sends an AES-encrypted response using the AES
session key (also using ECB mode).
We reiterate the following important points about this
protocol because they will be relevant to the attacks:
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• The only entropy source used by the client to choose
the AES session key is the current time in millisec-
onds.
• The client encrypts with the session key first, and
the server only responds if the client’s request is
properly encrypted with the correct AES key that
the client sent to the server with RSA encryption.
• The server “chops off” all but the 128 least signifi-
cant bits of the decrypted RSA plaintext, with these
128 least significant bits becoming the 128-bit AES
session key and all the other bits being ignored.
3 Passive, Offline attacks
In this section, for completeness, we present vulnerabili-
ties in QQ Browser that are devastating in the sense that
they allow all sessions to be decrypted completely of-
fline.
3.1 PRNG attack in QQ Browser
6.3.0.1920 for Android
As described in a previous report [15] analyzing QQ
Browser version 6.3.0.1920, that version’s PRNG algo-
rithm, shown in in Figure 1, decreases the entropy of the
AES session key used by the client for WUP requests
from the normal 2128 to 899999992 < 253. This vul-
nerability was rendered moot by the fact that this session
key is protected by a 128-bit RSA key.
3.2 128-bit RSA key in QQ Browser
6.3.0.1920
Although QQ Browser distinguishes itself from compet-
ing browsers by attempting to implement asymmetric
cryptography, the RSA key in version 6.3.0.1920 was
128 bits long and is easily factored using Wolfram Al-
pha or a factorization library:
245406417573740884710047745869965023463
= 14119218591450688427 · 17381019776996486069.
To resolve this vulnerability, QQ Browser increased
the RSA key size to 1024 bits in version 6.5.0.2170, but
the implementation of RSA is still textbook RSA with
no padding of any kind, leading to attacks on RSA’s mal-
leability as we discuss in Section 4. Note that even 1024-
bit RSA keys are considered to be too short for modern
attackers, and RSA keys of 2048 bits or more are gener-
ally recommended.
3.3 Hard-coded symmetric keys in QQ
Browser 6.3.0.1920
As described in a previous report [15], QQ Browser ver-
sion 6.3.0.1920 does use hard-coded symmetric keys in
some places, such as
\x25\x92\x3c\x7f\x2a\xe5\xef\x92
for DES encryption of the mobile device’s WiFi adapter
MAC address.
Unlike in version 6.5.0.2170 where the AES session
key is used for both WUP requests and their responses, in
version 6.3.0.1920 the session key is only used for the re-
quests. Responses from the server are sent using a mod-
ified version of the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in
a modified CBC block cipher mode. The following hard-
coded ASCII-encoded key is used:
sDf434ol*123+-KD
QQ Browser has at least an attempted implementation
of asymmetric cryptography, distinguishing it from less
security-conscious browsers such as UC Browser [12]
and Baidu Browser [14].
3.4 PRNG attack in QQ Browser
6.5.0.2170 for Android
The most recent vulnerability, the attack for which
we will refer to as the PRNG attack, is that the
AES key randomly generated for each WUP re-
quest is generated using a random number generator
(java.util.Random) seeded with the current time in mil-
liseconds (java.lang.System.currentTimeMillis()) before
generating every key (this is shown in Figure 2.) Thus,
to guess the key, one must know only the time that the
key was generated, which can be approximated by the
time that the WUP request was observed being transmit-
ted. By observing a WUP request and using the time
of its observation and simultaneously searching forward
and backward from that time, we were able to guess the
correct AES key in fewer than 70,000 guesses, i.e., the
key had been generated within 35,000 milliseconds.
To resolve this vulnerability, QQ Browser can use the
java.security.SecureRandom random number generator
with no explicitly passed seed (i.e., with the no-args con-
structor).
4 Active Attacks on QQ Browser’s Use of
Textbook RSA
In this section, we explore attacks on QQ Browser’s use
of textbook RSA.
4.1 CCA2 attack
The first attack, which we refer to as the CCA2 attack,
results from the fact that no key padding such as OAEP
is used when encrypting the AES key with RSA. Be-
cause of this, we are able to leverage the malleability of
RSA to perform a chosen ciphertext attack to guess the
AES key one bit at a time. The threat model for this
attack is an attacker with the ability to record a user’s en-
crypted session from the network. We call the client that
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int i = 10000000 + new Random().nextInt(89999999);
int j = 10000000 + new Random().nextInt(89999999);
return (String.valueOf(i) + String.valueOf(j)).getBytes();
Figure 1: Decompiled Java method generating an AES session key in version 6.3.0.1920.
Random random = new Random(System.currentTimeMillis());
byte[] bArr = new byte[8];
byte[] bArr2 = new byte[8];
random.nextBytes(bArr);
random.nextBytes(bArr2);
return new SecretKeySpec(ByteUtils.mergeByteData(bArr, bArr2), "AES");
Figure 2: Decompiled Java method generating an AES session key in version 6.5.0.2170.
the user is using the victim client. After recording the
user’s session, the attacker wants to determine the AES
key used for the WUP session so that they can decrypt
it. The attacker accomplishes this by making a series
of connections, using its own client, to the QQ Browser
server and attempting encrypted communications with
the server with a series of transformed RSA ciphertexts
to gain information about the original key used by the
victim client.
Let C be the RSA encryption of 128-bit AES key k
with RSA public key (n, e). Thus, we have
C ≡ ke (mod n)
Now let Cb be the RSA encryption of the AES key
kb = 2
bk
i.e., k bitshifted to the left by b bits. Thus, we have
Cb ≡ kbe (mod n)
We can compute Cb from only C and the public key, as
Cb ≡ C(2be mod n) (mod n)
≡ (ke mod n)(2be mod n) (mod n)
≡ ke2be (mod n)
≡ (2bk)e (mod n)
≡ kbe (mod n)
The third line follows from the fundamental property of
multiplication in modular arithmetic.
We begin the attack by consideringC127. It is the RSA
encryption of k127, the AES key where every bit but the
highest bit are necessarily zero and where k127’s highest
bit is k’s lowest bit (recall that the QQ Browser server
ignores all but the lowest 128 bits of the decrypted key).
We first guess that k127’s high bit is zero and send a WUP
request with C127 and encrypt the request with the key
where that bit is zero. If the server responds, that means
that the bit was zero, since it was able to decrypt our
request. If not, the bit must have been a one. After we
know this bit, we consider C126 and guess the next bit
(note that we know one of C126’s bits from C127). We
repeat this process for each bit of the AES key. In total,
this requires 128 guesses, since the AES key is 128 bits
and each request reveals one bit of the key. By using this
approach, we can iteratively learn every bit of the AES
key.
Recall from Section 2 that the server only responds if
the client sends a properly encrypted WUP request. If the
server sent predictable plaintext encrypted with the ses-
sion key from the client without first checking the client’s
request to make sure it decrypts properly, we could infer
more than one bit at a time by chopping off, e.g., 16 or
32 bits and performing a brute-force attack on the plain-
text/ciphertext pairs obtained from the server. However,
the client must properly encrypt the WUP request for the
server to respond, so inferring the session key one bit at
a time is the most efficient method of attack, which re-
quires 128 sessions to be initiated with the server by the
attacker.
As discussed in Section 6.2, we have implemented this
attack and tested it, and informed Tencent of the issue
as per ethical disclosure standards. To resolve this is-
sue, QQ Browser can use the OAEP key padding algo-
rithm to encrypt all AES keys. However, we recommend
that they use a well-tested implementation of SSL/TLS
to communicate all WUP requests as this would not only
fix this and other issues (such as the PRNG attack), but
also any other undiscovered issues in their cryptographic
implementation.
4.2 Offline attacks on textbook RSA
The CCA2 attack on QQ Browser is powerful in the
sense that a man-in-the-middle attacker can record a
user’s session and then easily recover the session key by
testing bits via 128 connections to QQ Browser’s server.
For a state actor that wants to decrypt all sessions and in-
dex them by IMEI, however, this is not ideal since over
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Bit-length m m1 m2 Probability
64
32 32 17%
33 33 29%
34 34 33%
30 36 40%
128
64 64 15%
66 66 28%
68 68 34%
60 72 39%
Table 1: Experimental probabilities of splitting into two
factors.
99% of the traffic to QQ Browser’s server would be gen-
erated by the attacker. For this reason, we investigated
known offline attacks on textbook RSA, finding that they
would not be practical for attacking QQ Browser.
Boneh et al. [7] demonstrate a meet-in-the-middle
style attack on textbook RSA, that is based on the ob-
servation that for an encrypted RSA message c ≡ Me
(mod N), if we can find small enough integers M1 ≤
2m1 and M2 ≤ 2m2 such that M =M1 ·M2, then:
c
M2
e ≡M1e (mod N)
By building a table with 2m1+1 ·max(m1,m2) bits of
memory and performing 2m2 modular exponentiations,
messages (i.e., session keys) can be recovered if they can
be written as M = M1 ·M2. The table and search are
per modulus and exponent, so for a single RSA scheme
(such as QQ Browser’s) the work would only need to be
done once and all sessions could be decrypted.
Table 1 shows the probabilities that a random 64- or
128-bit number, m, can be written asM =M1 ·M2 such
thatM1 ≤ 2m1 andM2 ≤ 2m2 . The data for 64-bit num-
bers nearly matches the corresponding probabilities from
Table 1 of Boneh et al. [7], and are only presented here
for verification and comparison purposes. We generated
data for 128-bit numbers because that is the size of QQ
Browser’s AES session keys. In terms of the underlying
assumption of Boneh et al.’s attack about factoring M ,
the attack is applicable to QQ Browser’s 128-bit session
keys. The resources necessary to carry out the attack are
probably out of the reach of even a state actor, however.
For example, for m1 = m2 = 64 and m = 128, the at-
tack would require a table of size 295,148 petabytes and
264 modular exponentiations.
We discuss Boneh et al.’s attack here because we an-
ticipate that in certain market segments textbook RSA
with smaller session key sizes may be common. We note
that implementations of ElGamal may be susceptible to
attacks for 128-bit session keys, since the attack on El-
Gamal presented by Boneh et al. can be split into more
than two factors. Also, it may be possible to combine at-
tacks that reduce the entropy of the session key with this
attack. Lastly, it may be possible in the CCA2 attack
to use RSA’s malleability in combination with Boneh
et al.’s meet-in-the-middle style attack to hide from QQ
Browser’s server which session key is being cracked.
5 Attacks on QQ Browser’s Update Mech-
anisms for Arbitrary Code Execution
In this section we discuss attacks on QQ Browser’s up-
date mechanisms, which are even more serious than at-
tacks on QQ Browser’s cryptography in the sense that
any man-in-the-middle attacker (including state actors)
could execute arbitrary code on a targeted user’s ma-
chine. We first discuss a straightforward attack on the
mobile version of QQ Browser’s update process. Then,
although we have discussed only the mobile version of
QQ Browser in this paper thus far, we then discuss
the update mechanism in the Windows version of QQ
Browser for desktop PCs. Market share data is unavail-
able for the Windows version, suggesting that it has far
short of the hundreds of millions of users that its mo-
bile counterpart has. However, together with the vulner-
ability in the mobile version, we present three increas-
ingly sophisticated attacks on QQ Browser’s update pro-
cess that demonstrate how digital signature verification
of downloaded software is insufficient to secure an up-
date process against active man-in-the-middle attacks.
5.1 Attack on mobile version updates
The mobile version of QQ Browser checks for and in-
stalls updates as follows:
1. The browser makes a WUP request to the update
server containing the current version of the browser
and asking if there are any updates available.
2. The server’s response contains a URL to an APK2
and an MD5 hash of the APK file. (If no update is
available, the server returns a response containing
no update information and the update process halts.)
3. The browser downloads the APK.
4. The browser computes its MD5 hash and verifies it
against the one provided by the server. (If the hashes
mismatch, the browser displays an error message
and the update process halts.)
5. The browser executes the ACTION_VIEW Android
intent against the downloaded APK.
At this point, the Android operating system takes over.
Under normal conditions, the system will present a UI
2An APK is an Android Application Package, a file format used by
the Android operating system for distributing mobile apps.
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asking the user whether to upgrade QQ Browser to a
newer version. However, other prompts are possible de-
pending on the APK the browser downloads that a man-
in-the-middle attacker may exploit. Android requires
that an APK upgrading an app be signed with the same
key as that of the currently installed APK, so an at-
tacker cannot simply upgrade QQ Browser to arbitrary
code. Moreover, Android also does not allow installing
any APK that would downgrade an app, and so a down-
grade attack is not possible. However, if the downloaded
APK is for a different app than that of QQ Browser or
any other app currently installed, then the user will be
prompted to install the APK instead of upgrading QQ
Browser. Although this requires user interaction, most
users would be unlikely to notice or appreciate the sig-
nificance of being prompted to install a new package in-
stead of upgrading an existing one, especially if the new
package were designed by an attacker to have the same
title and icon of QQ Browser.
In order for a man-in-the-middle attacker to cause the
browser to prompt to install a malicious APK, the at-
tacker must cause the browser to download the malicious
APK and send the browser the corresponding hash. As
the URLs to APKs we observed being sent by the QQ
Browser server were all unencrypted HTTP, a man-in-
the-middle attacker could attack the APK download it-
self, but then the APK would not have the same MD5
hash as that sent by the server. The feasibility of an
attacker forging the MD5 hash depends on the version
of QQ Browser requesting updates and the encryption it
uses for WUP requests.
Version 6.3.0.1920 of the browser always receives re-
sponses from the server encrypted with a symmetric,
hard-coded key (see Section 3.3). In this version the
attacker can respond to any WUP request to the up-
date server with a forged response containing a malicious
APK URL and its corresponding MD5 hash.
In later versions that use the AES session key to de-
crypt server responses, the attack requires a full man-in-
the-middle position or a man-on-the-side attacker who
can crack the session key fast enough using the attack
in Section 2 before the browser receives the real server’s
response. Alternatively, a man-on-the-side attacker can
have already redirected all traffic via (e.g.) DNS redirec-
tion and then perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
5.2 Attack on Windows version updates
The Windows version of QQ Browser checks for and in-
stalls updates as follows:
1. The browser sends an unencrypted JSON request
to the update server containing the current version
of the browser and asking if there are any updates
available.
2. The server’s unencrypted JSON response contains a
URL to an EXE3, an MD5 hash of an EXE file, and
the name of the file to save the file as. (If no update
is available, the server returns a response containing
no update information and the update process halts.)
3. The browser downloads the EXE and saves it in a
temporary directory using the file name provided by
the server.
4. The browser computes its MD5 hash and verifies it
against the one provided by the server. (If the hashes
mismatch, the browser displays an error message
and the update process halts.)
5. The browser verifies the EXE’s Authenticode digi-
tal signature to ensure that it was signed by Tencent.
(If it is not, the browser displays an error message
and the update process halts.)
6. The browser executes the downloaded EXE.
5.2.1 Attack via directory traversal
Since the update metadata is not protected by any asym-
metric cryptography, a man-in-the-middle attacker can
modify any of it. One attack is possible by modifying
the field specifying the name of the file. We found that
this field is not sanitized by the browser to prevent di-
rectory traversal. An attacker can overwrite any file on
the user’s machine that the user has permission to over-
write. (Since the file is downloaded before it is verified,
it need not have the correct digital signature nor even be
an EXE file.) For instance, we found that by using the
file name ../../../../../../../../../programfiles/
tencent/qqbrowser/qqbrowser.exe, we were
able to overwrite the QQ Browser executable with an ar-
bitrary program.4
5.2.2 Attack via other signed binaries
We found another vulnerability in the update process that
results from the fact that digital signature verification of
an EXE file does not, in general, verify that the down-
loaded EXE will perform its intended task such as up-
grading the browser. It only guarantees that the EXE
was signed by Tencent, and so any EXE signed by Ten-
cent can be substituted to satisfy the check. We found an
older web installer for QQ Browser signed by Tencent
that downloads an EXE unencrypted without any digital
signature verification. By first attacking QQ Browser to
download the web installer, and then attacking the web
3Specifically, an EXE is a Windows Portable Executable (PE) for-
mat binary program that can be executed on machines running the Win-
dows operating system.
4Although backslashes are typically used as a path separator on
Windows, the Windows kernel generally accepts forward slashes as a
path separator as well.
6
installer to download a malicious EXE, a man-in-the-
middle attacker can still attack the browser’s update pro-
cess to run an arbitrary program even though the browser
verifies the downloaded program’s digital signature. This
attack requires user interaction to run the web installer,
but it is unlikely that a user would be surprised to have
to run an installer after checking for updates. More-
over, there may exist an undiscovered Tencent-signed ex-
ecutable that would download and execute code without
any required user interaction that would remove the re-
quirement for user interaction from this attack.
6 Discussion and Related Work
Here, we discuss opportunities for research and ethical
issues.
6.1 Opportunities for research
Although market segments such as Chinese mobile web
browsers have very sophomoric cryptography implemen-
tations that lead to very simple attacks, there are several
interesting potential avenues of research. As pointed out
by Bratus et al. [8], an exploit serves as a constructive
proof that “unforeseen computations are indeed possi-
ble.” Exploits also lend credibility to security concerns
and therefore have pedagogical value in relaying the im-
portance of current best practices (cryptographic or oth-
erwise) to software developers, policy makers, the pub-
lic, and others. Thus, research into exploiting vulnerabil-
ities in less-developed (in terms of security and privacy)
market segments can have great value. Here, we point
out potential avenues of research in this respect that are,
in our opinion, under-served.
First, we found that there are relatively few attacks
in the literature for textbook RSA. Boneh’s survey pa-
per [6] about attacks on RSA mostly covers different
padding schemes and issues with, e.g., the choice of pub-
lic exponent. Existing CCA2 attacks on RSA implemen-
tations [2, 10, 20, 11, 17] are all Bleichenbacher-style at-
tacks [5]. Two exceptions are Boneh et al. [7] (discussed
in Section 4.2) and Kühn [16]. The latter presents attacks
that are similar to our CCA2 attack, but for schemes that
are de-facto padding schemes. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our CCA2 attack is the simplest and possibly the
only published attack for a real implementation of RSA
that has no padding.
Second, research into combining PRNG vulnerabili-
ties with other attacks, such as Boneh et al. [7], could
be very valuable for demonstrating the exploitability of
more subtle PRNG issues such as those reported by
Michaelis et al. [19]. We anticipate that the evolution
from the current state of cryptography in markets such
as Chinese mobile browsers to current best practices will
be a gradual evolution, and attacks that exploit conver-
sion issues such as DecryptoCat [23] or what we showed
in Section 3.1 will be very valuable during this transition
in order to keep “raising the bar.”
Lastly, attacks on update mechanisms could use a
more formal treatment to survey the different attack
primitives that are possible. Buffer overflows and other
memory corruption vulnerabilities have seen consider-
able research to categorize different primitives to enable
advanced exploit techniques (see, e.g., Bratus et al. [8] or
Shacham [22]). Attacks on update mechanisms by man-
in-the-middle attackers are not new, but they are becom-
ing increasingly important as state actors build up their
capabilities to detect vulnerable update services [1, 21]
and exploit them (see, e.g., [18]). Patterns emerge when
QQ Browser’s vulnerabilities are taken in the context of
existing work [13, 4], such as the re-use of code signed
by a company for other purposes as an exploit primitive.
We believe that more research in this important area is
needed.
6.2 Ethical considerations
With the exception of the respective vulnerabilities ex-
ploited in our PRNG attack and CCA2 attack, all vul-
nerabilities presented in this paper have been previously
published [15], and before that they were subjected to a
45-day vulnerability disclosure process in line with in-
ternational standards on vulnerability disclosure [9]. We
reported the two vulnerabilities that are newly presented
in this paper to Tencent (the developers of QQ Browser)
on 20 April 2016, so this paper is no longer emargoed as
of 4 June 2016.
We tested the CCA2 attack in Section 4.1 against QQ
Browser’s servers to verify that it worked. We cracked
session keys for three of our own test sessions. By send-
ing QQ Browser’s servers ciphertexts that decrypted into
plaintexts that went beyond the 128-bit boundary of a
typical session key we were putting QQ Browser’s server
at no more than usual risk of denial-of-service than any
other public-facing web server.
7 Conclusion
In summary, we have presented three classes of attacks
against QQ Browser, a piece of software that has hun-
dreds of millions of users and collects and transmits a
wide array of private data about them. The first class of
attacks allowed offline, passive decryption of all sessions
recorded. The second class of attacks was based on QQ
Browser’s use of plaintext RSA and included a CCA2
attack that allowed decryption of targeted sessions via
128 active connections to QQ Browser’s servers. The
third class of attacks enabled arbitrary code execution by
a man-in-the-middle attacker. All three classes of attacks
are very serious and illustrate the importance of further
research into attack techniques and primitives that are
common to the emerging threats posed by state actors,
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especially in market segments where security and privacy
best practices are underdeveloped.
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